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A commentary on
Wild psychometrics: Evidence for ‘general’ cognitive performance in wild New Zealand robins,
Petroica longipes
by Shaw, R. C., Boogert, N. J., Clayton, N. S., and Burns, K. C. (2015). Anim. Behav. 109, 101–111.
doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.08.001
Studies into the psychometric structure of human intelligence and cognitive ability have identified a
“g” or general factor, e.g., Buckhalt (2002), and in comparative psychology, in primates: Reader et al.
(2011) and in rodents: Matzel et al. (2003). As well as this “g” factor, intelligence is conceptualized
as possessing multiple specific intelligences. Due perhaps to more recent discoveries regarding
the complexity of birds cognitive abilities (see, Emery, 2016), birds have become the subject of
psychometric investigation (e.g., Ackerman, 2016).
Seminally, Shaw et al. (2015) assembled a test battery for avian cognition to assess the
cognitive abilities in New Zealand robins (Petroica longipes). Their test battery was comprised
of a series of, “tasks based on established measures of avian cognitive performance: a motor
task, color and shape discrimination, reversal learning, spatial memory and inhibitory control.”
(Shaw et al., 2015, p. 101). These scientists found robins to vary greatly in their ability to solve
tasks. They also discovered weak, positive, non-significant correlations between performances
on most tasks. They analyzed test performance using principle component analysis (PCA)
using the criteria for extracting components as being the possession of an eigenvalue of
unity or above. All sub-tests were found to load positively on the first component, which
explained >34% of between-test variance. As a consequence of this finding, the authors identified
this first factor aa a “g” factor, and concluded that New Zealand robins, tested in their
wild habitat, displayed a general cognitive factor analogous to the human “g” factor. They
continue to draw similarities between their own research and the body of literature on human
general intelligence. In their article, Shaw et al. (2015) state that: “In human psychometric
testing, individuals’ scores in tests of diverse cognitive processes are positively correlated,
and a “g” factor typically accounts for at least 40% of total variance” (Shaw et al., 2015, p
101).
However, several researchers, (e.g., Guttman, 1965, 1981; Koop, 1985; Guttman and Levy, 1991)
have expressed concerns with the use of PCA to analyze tests of cognition as this procedure
embodies specific assumptions regarding the data being analyzed that may not bemet. For example,
PCA requires that the data being subjected to PCA possesses the following characteristics: that the
data is parametric in nature; that there is a correspondence between the data and the psychological
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structure of the construct being assessed; that comparability
exists between the measurement scales in different sub-tests,
etc.
Within human psychometrics questions have been asked
regarding the nature of the relationship between general and
specific forms of intelligence. Rimoldi (1951) hypothesized upon
the nature of a “g” factor in intelligence. Koop (1985) notes how
Rimoldi proposed that the “g” component was better understood
as being a second-order factor (as being a product of specific
intelligences) rather than as a primary factor with secondary
specific intelligences. A psychometric approach that has been
employed to analyse human cognition (and many other forms
of behavior and experience) is that of facet theory (see Hackett,
2014, 2016). Typically, when a facet theory perspective is utilized,
a definitional framework, known as a mapping sentence, is
developed and research instruments are designed to investigate
this initial propositional definition. Data reduction techniques
(similar to PCA, but having different assumptions about the
data), such as smallest space analysis (SSA) and partial order
scalogram analysis (POSA) are used to test the veracity of
the mapping sentence. Another way in which facet theory
has been used is to analyse existing data sets. The data set
produced through Shaw et al.’s research into New Zealand robin’s
cognitive performance is a data set that would be suited to such
analysis.
An example of how a facet theory approach has been sued
to interrogate an existing data set is Koop’s (1985) reanalysis of
Rimoldi’s (1951) data using facet theory’s analytic procedure: SSA
and found a radial (qualitative) array of sub-tests (geometrical;
numerical and verbal tests). Furthermore, he discovered that
each of these sub-types of intelligence sub-tests were modified
in terms of whether a specific sub-test required: inference,
application or learning. Other researchers have divided the “g”
intelligence into two forms: fluid (gf) and crystalized (gc) general
intelligence (Cattell, 1963; Horn, 1988). Beauducel et al. (2001)
used the facet theory approach to investigate the structure
of fluid and crystalized general intelligence. They discovered
support for the discrete existence of the tests of: verbal,
numerical and figural abilities, with these being divided into:
fluid (gf) and crystalized (gc) general intelligence, in a 2 × 3
structure.
Shaw et al.’s (2015) psychometric test battery and framework
has demonstrated cognitive structures analogous to human
intelligence and their findings are an extremely important steps
toward better understanding how birds cognitively experience
and process their world. Of particular relevance to this
commentary is the fact that Shaw and colleagues identification
of a complex structure to exist within avian intelligence offers a
new research area for facet theory.
To conclude, facet theory approach has allowed the
depiction and modeling of human cognitive processes and
for understanding human intelligence. It is the contention of
this author that facet theory provides a way to conceptualize and
design avian cognition research. The approach also provides a
way to analyse data that arises from research designed in this way
using non-parametric techniques (e.g., SSA and POSA) to reveal
the structure of avian intelligence in the form of a mapping
sentence. By using a mapping sentence to design research and
non-parametric statistical analyses this allows the investigation
of the structure of avian intelligence in a way that does not make
unsubstantiated assumptions of the psychometric qualities of
the data. Furthermore, facet theory based research produces
cumulative and directly comparable results across studies
employing a faceted design. Thus, the use of facet theory could
potentially develop greater understanding of avian cognitive
processes.
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